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Abstract
The reliability of general self-rated health status is examined using the reform
of the public health insurance system of Germany in 2004 as a source of exogenous
variation. Amongothers, thereformintroducedaco-paymentforambulatorydoc-
tor visits and increased the co-payments for prescription drugs. This natural ex-
periment allows identiﬁcation of the causal impact of the program on self-assessed
health and hence reveals the sensitivity of this subjective measure to a perturba-
tion in the insurance system. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel,
the results indicate that after the policy intervention, the respondents in the treated
group perceived their own health status as better than their hypothetical untreated
state even when there is no discernible impact on actual health.
JEL classiﬁcation: G22, H43, I18
Keywords: natural experiment, cognitive dissonance, self-rated health status
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Measuresofsubjectivewell-beingarenowextensivelyusedinmanyareasofempirical
economics. These measures are particularly prevalent in studies that deal with gen-
erallifesatisfaction[WinkelmannandWinkelmann1998;Kassenb¨ ohmerandHaisken-
DeNew 2009], job satisfaction [Hamermesh 2001], and health [Bago d’Uva et al. 2008;
Bago d’Uva, O’Donnell and van Doorslaer 2008]. At least two reasons give rise to
the wide availability of this type of data in surveys. One is that it is relatively inex-
pensive to collect and the other is that it is fairly simple for both the interviewer and
the respondent to understand. Questions eliciting subjective assessments are typically
short and simple such that the respondents are forthcoming with their answers. For
example, current health status is self-assessed using a ﬁve-point scale.1 This is a rather
cheap alternative to extracting a blood sample and having it tested in a qualiﬁed med-
ical laboratory, a point also made by Hamermesh [2004]. In the latter, the interviewer
should be a trained medical technologist or at least accompanied by one. There is also
the possibility that the respondent may not cooperate at all considering the level of in-
trusion a blood extraction entails. The attractiveness of subjective measures to survey
designers is therefore understandable.
Despitesomeskepticism[BertrandandMullainathan2001], thesemeasureshave—
at least recently—proved to be enticing to economists and other social scientists as
well. The use of these variables in social studies has become so popular primarily be-
cause the wide availability of the data lends itself to analysis, if not invites it. Hamer-
mesh [2004] calls this the “Mt. Everest phenomenon”.2 Happiness or life-satisfaction
research exempliﬁed by Easterlin [1995], for example, has enjoyed a boom in eco-
nomics.3 Economists now routinely analyze the impact of certain exogenous changes
1The typical question is “How would you describe your current health?”. A respondent can choose
among the following answers: “very good”, “good”, “satisfactory”, “poor”, and “bad”.
2Asked why he wanted to climb Mt. Everest, George Mallory, an English mountaineer who died
scaling the mountain, famously retorted, “Because it’s there.”
3For a survey, see Frey and Stutzer [2002].
2on one or another subjective outcome, e.g., the effect of unemployment on either life
satisfaction [Kassenb¨ ohmer and Haisken-DeNew 2009] or health, measured as self-
assessed health [B¨ ockerman and Ilmakunnas 2009].
Self-rated health status (SRHS) is perhaps one of the most common subjective mea-
sure that one ﬁnds in the literature. This is used both in econometric as well as in
epidemiological research. Since the study of Mossey and Shapiro [1982], SRHS has
been generally accepted as a good predictor of mortality and morbidity, particularly
in the epidemiological literature. However, the reliability of SRHS is obviously not un-
questionable. Using Australian data, Crossley and Kennedy [2002] show that SRHS is
sensitive to the type of questions that preceded it—what Bertrand and Mullainathan
[2001] call the “ordering effect”. As an example, if previous questions elicited good
memories, then the respondent is more likely to rate her health as good. Bound
[1991] points out the endogeneity problem that arises out of using SRHS in labor-
force-participation studies. Retirement decisions made for reasons other than health
(say, a person could not get along with co-workers), for example, may be rationalized
by people by instead claiming that they were no longer able to work due to health
reasons, which carries with it less stigma than some other possible reasons. On top
of the problem induced by measurement error, self-assessed health is also subject to
reporting heterogeneity. For example, Bago d’Uva et al. [2008] show that subjective
measures suffer from differential reporting on the basis of the level of education and
income. Thus, this measure of health is apparently not very stable.
This paper contributes to the literature on the reliability of SRHS speciﬁcally and
measures of subjective well-being in general by exploiting a natural experiment in the
health insurance system. In 2004, a major health insurance reform was adopted in
Germany that effectively raised the price of medical services. We estimate the causal
impact of this reform on SRHS. The reason we expect the reform to have an effect on
SRHS—irrespective of whether or not there was a concomitant appreciation of objec-
tive health—is related to at least two strands of the literature. The ﬁrst involves the
3problem of “cognitive dissonance”; the other is related to the informational effect of
prices. These are explained in more detail in Section 2.
In this paper, we ﬁnd that the reform had a positive and signiﬁcant (albeit mod-
est) effect on SRHS, i.e., that the reform made people perceive themselves as healthier.
However, this perception of one’s health improvement is not accompanied by a corre-
sponding improvement of actual or objective health. Thus, we show that a subjective
measure of health such as SRHS ﬂuctuates even without any change in objective mea-
sures of health. That is, there are other factors that inﬂuence SRHS that are presumably
unrelated to a person’s actual health status.4 While SRHS is traditionally thought of as
a function of objective health plus some other factors, what we show here is that one
of these factors includes the price of health services through either its signaling effect
or cognitive dissonance and not merely through its effect on the quantity demanded
of health services.
We therefore provide another piece of evidence that invites caution in the use of
these subjective measures, particularly of SRHS. The implication is that survey de-
signers should collect more objective measures of health if this is cost-efﬁcient. In this
regard, the use of biomarkers (biological indicators) in data-gathering have become
increasingly common even in developing countries.5 Moreover, health researchers
would be better off using such measures if they are available. While we are far from
saying that subjective measures are meaningless6, we do emphasize that research us-
ing these measures should always be taken with a grain of salt.
4Whether or not this improvement in self-assessed health is important in and of itself is an issue
left for further research. For example, does the fact that one thinks of oneself as healthy positively
contribute to one’s actual health?
5Biomarkers include measures obtained from blood samples as well as simple anthropometrics,
such as height, weight, and waist circumference. Other routine biomakers that do not involve extremely
intrusive methods include the systolic and diastolic blood pressures.
6In fact, they are likely to be pregnant with meaning such that disentangling the components of,
say, general life satisfaction is considered to be a worthwhile endeavor by some. However, the extent to
which economists can contribute to the literature is unclear. For a discussion, see Hamermesh [2004].
42 Theoretical considerations
Eyster [2002] develops a model where economic agents have a taste for consistency.
In the model, people experience what psychologists call cognitive dissonance, a phe-
nomenon wherein the agent changes her beliefs over the utility she derives from her
actions. A related concept is “conﬁrmatory bias”, where new information is processed
by agents in such a way as to conﬁrm currently held beliefs [Yariv 2005]. Among other
reasons, cognitive dissonance is triggered by the “sunk-cost effect”. An example is
somebody who stays until the end of a movie that she realizes to be horrible ﬁve min-
utes in because she has already paid for the ticket. While standard economic theory
would have us believe that the sunk cost of the ticket should not factor into the deci-
sion of the viewer to stay or go, it is not unusual for people to rationalize the sunk cost
by holding out until the end credits have started rolling. This is why the phenomenon
is sometimes referred to as “escalation of commitment” or “entrapment” [Eyster 2002;
Ashraf, Berry and Shapiro 2007]. The assumption here is that the act of paying for
something that turns out to be non-enhancing to utility has itself a disutility apart
from the cost price (e.g., the feeling of regret). In order to avoid this extra cost, people
“rationalize the past” for their actions to be consistent.
It is possible that the health insurance reform triggered the phenomenon of cog-
nitive dissonance. As part of the reform package, a co-payment for doctor visits was
introduced which effectively raised the price of health services. While the quality of
medical services may have remained the same, the fact that people are now paying
for something that used to be free may induce them to think that their health is actu-
ally better than before. This allows them to avoid the psychological cost of paying for
nothing.
The change in the effective price could also have an impact on SRHS due to the in-
formational effect of prices. As early as 1944, Scitovszky already pointed out that peo-
ple may infer the quality of a product or service from its price. He says, “A commodity
5offered at a lower price than competing commodities will be both more attractive to
the consumer on account of its greater cheapness and less attractive on account of its
suspected inferior quality.” Evidence of this type of behavior wherein price is used as
a signal for the quality of the good is observed in many markets, e.g., “fountain-pen
ink and car wax and vodka, skis, and television sets” [Bagwell and Riordan 1991 and
the references therein]. This is also seen in the wine market [Gergaud and Livat 2007]
and there is some evidence that consumers also use price as a signal of quality in the
market for genetically-modiﬁed food [Hwang, Roe and Teisl 2006].7
The phenomenon is more prevalent in markets where there is a high degree of in-
formation asymmetry between sellers and buyers (as in the case between doctors, who
provide medical service, and patients, who demand it). To ameliorate the asymmetry,
sellers may use a high price to signal to the consumer that their wares are of high
quality, with the assumption that high-quality goods are more expensive to produce.
If consumers observe an increase in price after the reform, they may associate this with
an increase in the effectiveness of the service.8
Especially relevant is the study of Shiv, Carmon and Ariely [2005]. In an experi-
ment, they show that people who pay the discounted price for a particular product
(in this case, an energy drink) derive less beneﬁt from it than people who pay the
full price. They call this the “placebo effect” which works at the subconscious level.
Since the reform of the insurance system in Germany effectively raised the price of
health services, consumers may experience a perceptible change in its efﬁcacy. They
may therefore rate themselves as healthier since the price change is associated with an
improvement in the perceived effectiveness of the service.
7This issue is related to Veblen goods, named after Thorstein Veblen, who noted the phenomenon
of conspicuous or ostentatious consumption. For Veblen goods, a price increase is associated with
an increase in quantity demanded but the mechanism by which this occurs is not through consumer
optimization given a budget constraint—as in Giffen goods—but rather through an interaction between
prices and preferences. [Leibenstein 1950]
8The conditions under which the signal is credible, i.e., where the low-quality producers cannot
successfully imitate the signal of the high-quality producers, is derived in the seminal work of Akerlof
[1970]. See also Bagwell and Riordan [1991]. In the text, the consumer is comparing two goods from
different time periods. In standard models, a consumer has two types of goods in the same period.
However, this is just a change in the frame of reference.
63 Institutional background
TheGermanhealthinsurancesystemispracticallydividedintotwoindependentparts:
the public or statutory component and the private component. The former covers
roughly 90 percent of the population while the latter accounts for most of the rest.
Within these two systems are dozens of providers, although those belonging to the
statutory health insurance (SHI) system are highly regulated and hence are hardly dif-
ferentiated. The option of individuals to choose from either one of these systems is
legally regulated. Notably, employees whose salary falls below an income threshold
(which stood at e3,975 per month in 2007) cannot opt out of the public insurance sys-
tem9. Those who earn more can choose between being insured under the public sys-
tem or the private system. The self-employed are also freely able to choose between
the two systems.
While not set in stone, the placement of an individual in one of these systems is
almost permanent. Incentives are in place that effectively discourage switching be-
tween the two systems and, presumably, multiple switching in one person’s lifetime
is rare. This strict division is exploited in this paper to identify the causal effect of a
health insurance reform on SRHS. The reform package described in the next section
affected only those who are in the SHI system, effectively creating a treatment group
and a control group, the latter principally composed of the privately insured. The pol-
icy handle in this institutional setting is exogenous and there is no ambiguity in the
direction of causation.
On 1 January 2004, the Statutory Health Insurance Modernization Act10 (GMG)
came into force in Germany.11 The major components of the Act are the introduction
9In German, this is Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung, which is why the common translation into En-
glish is “statutory health insurance” instead of merely “public”. It is not simply that one is barred from
entering the private system instead of the public; it is that one is mandated or compelled to be insured
under the public system. This is the reason that the fraction of uninsured people in Germany is negligi-
ble. In this paper, the terms “public insurance” and “statutory insurance” are used interchangeably.
10In German, Gesetz zur Modernisierung der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung or simply GMG for
Gesundheitsmodernisierungsgesetz.
11There was also a reform in the hospital sector of Germany in 2004. Hospitals shifted away from a
7of co-payments for ambulatory doctor visits, an increase in the co-payments for pre-
scription medicine, and the exclusion of over-the-counter (OTC) drugs from insurance
coverage. This set of policy interventions applied to the publicly insured who are at
least 18 years old. The explicit objective of the GMG is to reduce public health care
costs by manipulating the price faced by consumers of health care services.
Due to the GMG, people who are part of the SHI system are now required to pay
e10 for their ﬁrst doctor visit per calendar quarter (with a few exemptions). Subse-
quent visits to the same doctor or to another doctor—provided a referral from the ﬁrst
doctor is obtained—in the same quarter are not charged the co-payment. Emergency
visits to the hospital are also subject to the same scheme. That is, despite having paid
e10 for a ﬁrst-time visit to a doctor, one is also charged another e10 if one ends up
in the emergency room within the same quarter. As regards prescription drugs, co-
payments now range from e5 to e10, depending on the size of the drug package.
Some OTC drugs that were previously prescribed anyway by the doctor were paid for
by the insurance company. The recent reform put a stop to this practice. Now, all OTC
drugs are paid for by the consumer in full.
Potentially, total expenditure just for the co-payments for ambulatory care could be
e120 per year for a three-person household whose members are all publicly insured
and are not exempt from co-payments, accounting for less than 1 percent of the mean
annual household net income of the lowest income quintile of people in the SHI sys-
tem (e15,524).12 Moreover, the schedule of co-payments is constructed in such a way
that people are able to control the total amount of co-payments by keeping all doctor
visits in one quarter. It is no surprise therefore that studies looking at the effect of the
increase in co-payments for ambulatory doctor visits on the number of such visits of
cost-plus reimbursement system to a prospective-payment system. In the new system, hospitals receive
a ﬁxed payment for the treatment of a patient. This introduced incentives for hospitals to contain costs
[Schwierz 2009]. However, this new system is more likely to negatively contribute to a patient’s health.
To the extent that the mapping from objective health to self-assessed health is monotonic, we should
therefore expect SRHS to decline, ceteris paribus, after the hospital reform. The positive and signiﬁcant
effect we present in Section 5.2 may be thus said to be somewhat understated.
12This is the mean for the lowest income quintile of those who are publicly insured in the constructed
sample used in this paper. The details of how the sample was selected are described in Section 4.
8the publicly insured conclude that it failed to achieve its stated objective [Augurzky,
Bauer and Schaffner 2006; Schrey¨ ogg and Grabka 2008].
4 Data construction and description
The data used for the present analysis come from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP).13 The SOEP is a representative and longitudinal annual survey that started in
1984. In 2008, more than 20,000 persons were sampled. Further details can be found
in Wagner, Frick and Schupp [2007].
The waves 2000–2003 and 2005–2007 (seven waves) of the SOEP are used here (i.e.,
four years before and three years after the reform became effective). The data collected
in 2004 were discarded because of the way the questions on the number of doctor and
hospital visits were asked. The questions are, “Have you gone to a doctor within the
last three months?” and “Were you ever admitted to a hospital for at least one night
in the previous year?” Since most interviews are conducted in the ﬁrst quarter of the
year, the answers from 2004 straddle both the pre-intervention and post-intervention
periods. To be consistent with the other papers that look at the GMG, those who
are older than 65 years are also dropped. Civil servants were also dropped from the
sample because of their special insurance status.14
We also dropped individuals who changed from public to private insurance and
vice versa (7,251 observations). The intention of deleting these observations is to keep
the sample unadulterated: everyone in the sample remains in the same group before
and after the policy intervention. The concerns over substitution and dropout biases
[Heckman et al. 2000], wherein either members of the control group seek the treatment
13The data used in this paper were extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz v2.0 (Nov 2007)
for Stata R . PanelWhiz was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew <john@panelwhiz.eu>. The
PanelWhiz generated DO ﬁle to retrieve the SOEP data used here and any Panelwhiz Plugins are avail-
able upon request. Any data or computational errors in this paper are my own. Haisken-DeNew and
Hahn [2006] describe PanelWhiz in detail.
14Civil servants (Beamte in German) receive state assistance which roughly covers 50 percent of their
expenditures for health care services.
9on their own or members of the treatment group drop out of treatment, are thus miti-
gated. Ultimately, the operational sample contains 89,897 person–year observations.15
When randomization is successfully carried out, observational units in the treat-
ment and control groups can be expected to be similar at least across observable char-
acteristics at baseline (i.e., pre-intervention). The goal is to have a control group that
is a suitable counterfactual to the treatment group with the only difference being the
random assignment into treatment. It is therefore prudent to examine the differences
in means between the statutorily insured and the privately insured in terms of impor-
tant characteristics. This is presented in Table 1, where it is shown that the publicly
insured are different from the privately insured. We therefore control for these observ-
able differences by including these variables in the regression analyses.
5 Identiﬁcation, estimation, and discussion
5.1 Identiﬁcation strategy
Consider the linear DID estimation strategy, which can be represented as a two-way
ﬁxed-effects regression model:
SRHSit = a + dSi + t (Si  Pt) + b0Xit + q0Zt + uit, (1)
where SRHSit is the SRHS of individual i in year t, Si is a treatment-group indicator
that takes on the value of 1 if individual i is statutorily insured, Pt is a dummy variable
that is equal to 1 if the observation is from 2005 or later, Xit is a vector of control
variables, Zt is a vector of person-invariant year ﬁxed effects, and uit is a stochastic
15Observations that do not contain information in any of the covariates used in the regressions are
also dropped with the assumption that these pieces of information are missing completely at random.
Retaining the insurance system switchers did not substantially affect the results described below. More-
over, with their inclusion, we are able to estimate the model with individual-level ﬁxed effects (FE). The
results presented in Section 5.2 hold as well in the conditional FE ordered logit model [Chamberlain
1980; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004].
10TABLE 1 —EQUALITY-OF-MEANS TEST, PRE-INTERVENTION OBSERVATIONS
Variable Privately Publicly Difference Standard
insured insured error
SRHS 3.720 3.541 0.179 0.015
Female 0.342 0.528  0.186 0.008
Age 44.679 40.596 4.082 0.201
Years of education 14.259 11.955 2.304 0.039
Living with children under 16 0.392 0.417  0.026 0.008
Number of children 0.679 0.736  0.057 0.016
Living in West Germany 0.863 0.747 0.116 0.007
Immigrant 0.063 0.152  0.090 0.006
(log) Household net income 8.521 8.079 0.443 0.009
(log) Household labor income 11.049 10.400 0.650 0.014
White-collar worker 0.363 0.393  0.030 0.008
Blue-collar worker 0.021 0.274  0.253 0.007
Married 0.695 0.648 0.048 0.008
Widowed 0.007 0.016  0.009 0.002
Divorced 0.078 0.062 0.016 0.004
Separated 0.017 0.017 0.000 0.002
Full-time employed 0.679 0.525 0.153 0.008
Part-time employed 0.048 0.139  0.091 0.006
Self-employed 0.386 0.038 0.348 0.004
Not currently working 0.218 0.245  0.026 0.007
Partner died recently 0.001 0.002  0.001 0.001
Recent separation from partner 0.018 0.017 0.001 0.002
Recently divorced 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.001
Had a child born 0.041 0.038 0.003 0.003
Disabled 0.048 0.067  0.019 0.004
Smoker 0.262 0.311  0.049 0.008
Degree of handicap 2.596 3.878  1.281 0.247
SOURCE: Own computation based on SOEP 2000–2003. Numbers were rounded off to the nearest
thousandths.
disturbance term. We refer to (Si Pt) as the DID variable and t as the DID coefﬁcient.
The parameter of interest is t, which is the average treatment effect of the policy on
the outcome variable for the treated group (ATET for “average treatment effect on
the treated”).16 Estimating t from Equation (1) removes the bias associated with the
permanent difference between the treatment and control groups.
A complication is the ordinal nature of the dependent variable: SRHS is measured
in a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “bad” and 5 is “very good”.17 One can straightfor-
wardly estimate a pooled ordered logit (POL) model to take this into account. The
reported SRHS can be thought of as a discretized realization of an unobserved contin-
16Henceforth, the (average) treatment effect mentioned here refers to the ATET.
17The original scaling in the dataset is reversed (i.e., 1 is “very good”).
11uous variable that represents the perception of one’s health, SRHS, which is assumed
to have a linear index: SRHS
it = g0Wit + #it, where Wit is a vector of covariates and
#it is a typical error term that is assumed to have a logistic distribution. The reported
SRHS is linked to its latent counterpart by the following rule:
SRHSit = j if fj 1 < SRHS
it  fj,
where i = 1,..., N, t = 1,...,Ti, and j 2 f1,2,3,4,5g. The fj’s are unknown cut-
pointsorthresholdparametersthathavetobesimultaneouslyestimatedwith g, which
contains the parameter of interest (the causal effect of the GMG on SRHS). As usual, it
is assumed that f0 =  ¥ and f5 = ¥. This is implemented in a DID framework by
simply replacing the linear index function in the ordered logit model with the index
provided in Equation (1) minus the constant a.
One can alternatively give a cardinal interpretation to the dependent variable and
then estimate an ordinary least-squares (OLS) model. OLS has the advantage of pro-
viding a simple way to calculate the ATET since the estimated coefﬁcients can directly
be interpreted as the treatment effect. The obvious limitation here is that the nonlin-
ear conditional expectation function is only linearly approximated. Nevertheless, we
estimated both a linear and a nonlinear model.
5.2 Estimation results
Table 2 presents the results following the estimation of the POL and OLS models, re-
spectively. Columns (1) and (3) present results with no socioeconomic control vari-
ables (i.e., the model is estimated only with a treatment indicator, the DID variable,
quarter dummies, and year ﬁxed effects). Columns (2) and (4) include the follow-
ing control variables: sex, age (and its square), years of schooling, whether a child
below 16 years old lives in the household, the number of children living in the house-
hold, (log) household net income, (log) household labor income, dummy variables for
12white- orblue-collar workers, dummyvariables forcivil status(married, widowed, di-
vorced, or separated), dummy variables for employment status (full-time, part-time,
self-employed, or not currently employed), the number of days the respondent was
unable to work in the previous year, dummy variables for life shocks (partner recently
died, recently separated from partner, recently divorced, recently had a child born),
whether the respondent is disabled, the degree of disability, whether the respondent
is a smoker, whether it was an oral interview, whether the respondent lives in West
Germany, whether the respondent visited a doctor in the previous quarter, whether
the respondent visited a hospital in the previous year, and whether the respondent is
an immigrant.
TABLE 2 —REGRESSION RESULTS
POL OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DID coefﬁcient 0.148*** 0.121** 0.058*** 0.042**
[0.047] [0.050] [0.022] [0.020]
Controls None Full None Full
(c2-) F-statistic (252.41) (11,276.20) 22.47 328.09
(Pseudo) R2 (0.002) (0.105) 0.005 0.244
Observations 89,897 89,897
NOTES: Bracketed numbers are standard errors clustered at the individual level.
Regressions include quarter dummies and year ﬁxed effects. See text for the list
of other control variables. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
SOURCE: Own computation based on SOEP 2000–2003 and 2005–2007.
In all four speciﬁcations, the estimates of the DID coefﬁcient come up as positive
and signiﬁcant. The estimates are also robust to the inclusion of socioeconomic control
variables although their inclusion reduces the magnitude of the coefﬁcient estimates.
The estimated DID coefﬁcients from OLS regressions can be directly interpreted as the
ATET, which ranges from 0.042 to 0.058, and these estimates are all signiﬁciant at least
at the 5-percent level. The standard errors are clustered at the individual level since
the observations are pooled and therefore it is unlikely that observations for the same
individual in different years are independent of each other. To address this issue, we
allow for an arbitrary covariance structure within each cluster (i.e., each person).
13Based on the estimated treatment effects, one could say that the impact is by no
means large. However, it is robust to both changes in the functional form18 and the
inclusion of additional covariates. While the magnitude of the estimated coefﬁcient
becomes smaller when using the full set of control variables, this only means that
we are properly accounting for possible differential time effects that are functions of
covariates as discussed in Section 5.4. To get an idea of the size of this effect, we com-
pare the treatment effect with the estimated coefﬁcient of (log) household net income,
which is 0.092 with a standard error of 0.010. Using the treatment effect in Column
(4), we ﬁnd that the reform is equivalent to raising household net income by 0.45 log
points or by about e1.57 per month.
Overall, the results indicate that there was deﬁnitely an improvement in the SRHS
of the publicly insured in Germany after the GMG of 2004. Whether this was purely
a psychological effect such as cognitive dissonance or the result of an actual improve-
ment of health status is discussed in the next section.
5.3 Objective health measures
Studies of causal effects do not necessarily identify the mechanism through which an
action generates a reaction. Isolating the pathways through which a policy affects an
outcome variable of interest requires more than parameter estimates of treatment ef-
fects. For example, there are multiple ways through which the GMG can affect SRHS.
It could be through an actual improvement in health or merely a psychological ef-
fect that has nothing to do with one’s objective health status. We therefore examined
whether there was an improvement in the actual health of the publicly insured after
the reform of 2004. If we ﬁnd evidence that objective health measures improved, then
the positive and signiﬁcant effect on SRHS of the health insurance modernization re-
form that we found in Section 5.2 would not be puzzling at all. In the absence of any
18Although, technically, the estimated coefﬁcients from the nonlinear DID models cannot be inter-
preted as treatment effects. Nevertheless, Puhani [2008] shows that the sign and signiﬁcance of the
coefﬁcient estimate carry over to the ATET if one undertakes its computation.
14such objective improvement, the change in SRHS is likely the result of a mere change
in preferences of the consumers of health services in response to the effective price
increase or the result of using the increased price as a signal of higher-quality (and
hence effectivity) health services. To test this, we implemented DID regressions sim-
ilar in structure to Equation (1) using a variety of outcome variables of interest. The
results of these regressions are presented in Table 3.
TABLE 3 —EFFECT ON OBJECTIVE MEASURES OF HEALTH
Regressand PCS‡ MCS‡ Hospital Doctor Days unable
visit visit to work
DID coefﬁcient  0.131 0.057 0.053 0.010 0.113
[0.260] [0.342] [0.092] [0.055] [0.097]
(c2-) F-statistic 238.19 44.80 (4,490.97) (2,442.12) (3,507.39)
(Pseudo) R2 0.317 0.073 (0.086) (0.047) —
Observations 25,646 25,646 89,897 89,897 89,897
Model† OLS OLS Logit Logit ZINB
NOTES: Bracketed numbers are standard errors clustered at the individual level. All regressions
include a full set of control variables. † We used ordinary least squares, logit, and zero-inﬂated
negative binomal models as appropriate. ‡ The Physical Component Summary and Mental Com-
ponent Summary scales are only available for the years 2002 and 2006. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
SOURCE: Own computation based on SOEP 2000–2003 and 2005–2007.
Unfortunately, the dataset does not contain an actual measure of objective health
status such as those that could be obtained from biomarkers. However, we assume
that the following variables, taken together, serve as a better proxy for objective health
status since these could less likely be inﬂuenced by non-health-related factors. These
objective measures include the Physical Component Summary (PCS) scale, Mental
Component Summary (MCS) scale, the probability of staying in a hospital, the prob-
ability of visiting a doctor, and the number of days absent from work. Two studies
have already shown that the reform had no effect on the probability of visiting a doc-
tor [Augurzky, Bauer and Schaffner 2006; Schrey¨ ogg and Grabka 2008]. We conﬁrm
their results here. For the PCS and MCS scales, least-squares regressions are estimated.
A logit model is used for the probability of staying in a hospital and a zero-inﬂated
negative binomial model is used for the number of days absent from work.
Using these ﬁve additional objective measures of health, we found that the reform
15had no signiﬁcant effect. It is therefore much more plausible that people responded
to the reform by adjusting their preferences or expectations with regard to health ser-
vices.
5.4 Parallel trends
The DID estimator is biased if there are divergent trends in the outcome variable for
the two groups. Let SRHSit,s be the SRHS of individual i at time t in state s, where s is
equal to 1 if the individual is exposed to treatment. The parallel-trends assumption is
then:
E[SRHSi2,0   SRHSi1,0js = 1] = E[SRHSi2,0   SRHSi1,0js = 0], (2)
whichsays that theobservableE[SRHSi2,0   SRHSi1,0js = 0] isan unbiased estimateof
the unobservable counterfactual E[SRHSi2,0   SRHSi1,0js = 1]. Proceeding to estimate
a DID model where Equation (2) does not hold results in an unreliable measure of the
treatment effect.
Situations in which Equation (2) is not satisﬁed include the presence of differential
secular time effects. For example, if these time effects actually depend on one’s level
of income, and income determines selection into the treatment group (as it does in
this case with a federally mandated income threshold), then the simple DID estimator
(i.e., without controls) will not properly identify the treatment effect. Therefore, we
included control variables in the regression to alleviate the concern about the consis-
tency of the estimator as well as to improve its efﬁciency.
In this paper, two increasingly common approaches are pursued to statistically test
whether there were parallel trends in the pre-intervention periods. The ﬁrst follows Di
Tella and Schargrodsky [2004]. All post-intervention observations are dropped from
the sample. Then, regressions are ran on the dependent variables: ﬁrst, the DID vari-
able is redeﬁned such that the GMG became effective in 2001; second, such that the
GMG became effective in 2002. We call these “placebo regressions”. If the SHI and
16PHI exhibited common trends before the actual intervention in 2004, then the esti-
mated treatment effect in these placebo regressions should not be signiﬁcantly differ-
ent from zero. Indeed, Table 4 shows that the results from these regressions validate
the DID strategy.
TABLE 4 —PLACEBO REGRESSIONS
2001 placebo 2002 placebo
POL OLS POL OLS
DID coefﬁcient 0.076 0.030 0.073  0.031
[0.070] [0.027] [0.060] [0.023]
(c2-) F-statistic (8,245.99) 267.67 (8,246.60) 267.74
(Pseudo) R2 (0.109) 0.251 (0.109) 0.251
Observations 54,768 54,768
NOTES: Bracketed numbers are standard errors clustered at the individual le-
vel. Regressions include a full set of control variables. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
SOURCE: Own computation based on SOEP 2000–2003.
The second approach pursued here follows and expands on Galiani, Gertler and
Schargrodsky [2005]. Again, all post-intervention observations are deleted and the
treatment-group indicator is then interacted with all the pre-intervention year dum-
mies except for 2000, which serves as the base year. POL and OLS models are then
estimated. The coefﬁcients of the interaction terms in these models are subsequently
testedinthreeways: ﬁrst, ifeachoneisseparatelysigniﬁcant; second, iftheyarejointly
signiﬁcant; third, whether they are equal to each other. For both models, these coefﬁ-
cients are each and jointly insigniﬁcant and are equal to each other, which reinforces
the identiﬁcation strategy used here.
5.5 Further results
In this section, we present four further important results. First, we estimate the effect
of the reform on general life satisfaction. In the dataset, this is measured using an 11-
point scale from 0 to 10, with 10 being the most satisﬁed. We show that the positive
effect of the reform is speciﬁc to SRHS and not to general life satisfaction. Second,
we perform the same analysis using an alternative control group. This is important to
17show that the signiﬁcant treatment effect estimated in Section 5.2 is not just an artifact
of using the privately insured as the control group. Third, to the extent that only those
people who actually visited a doctor would change their subjective assessments of
their own health, we kept only observations with at least one doctor visit in the last
month and then performed the regressions again. Finally, to get an understanding of
the heterogeneous impact of the reform, we split the sample into males and females to
show that sex may play a role.
We found that the publicly insured experienced a reduction in their general life
satisfaction. The DID-coefﬁcient estimates [standard errors] are  0.071 [0.045] and
 0.081 [0.038] for the POL and OLS models, respectively, using a full set of control
variables. Both SRHS and general life satisfaction are measures of subjective well-
being and in this case, we might expect them to move in the same direction. For ex-
ample, a shift in the optimism of people might move these self-assessments upwards.
However, we show that the reform of the health insurance system in Germany only
increased self-assessed health and hence rule out confounders similar to one’s opti-
mism. If anything, the publicly insured saw a deterioration in other aspects of their
lives that dominate the improvement in SRHS. This may be caused by the added bur-
den of increased prices for health care services. That we still found a positive effect on
SRHS is therefore all the more remarkable.
The GMG of 2004 provides an alternative control group because the reform only
applied to the statutorily insured who are at least 18 years old. This allows us to test
the robustness of our result by re-estimating the model using an alternative control
group that consists only of the privately insured 18-year olds and all the 17-year olds.
For this analysis, we restrict the sample to adolescents aged 17 to 18, resulting in 1,391
person–year observations, of which 461 (33 percent) constitute the control group.
We implemented a DID regression model as in Equation (1). However, the control
variables now only consist of the following: sex, years of education, (log) household
net income, (log) household labor income, civil status (whether married or not), em-
18ploymentstatus(indicatorvariablesforfull-timeemployment, part-timeemployment,
self-employment, and not currently working), whether the respondent had a child re-
cently, whether the respondent is disabled and the degree of disability, whether the
respondent recently visited the hospital, whether the respondent recently visited a
doctor, and whether the respondent is a smoker.
The regression results from the POL and OLS models support the ﬁndings in Sec-
tion 5.2. The estimated DID coefﬁcient [s.e.] from the POL model is 0.525 [0.233], while
the corresponding value from OLS is 0.214 [0.092]. Notably, the estimated ATET using
the alternative control group is substantially higher than that from using the pool of
the privately insured as the control group. This could either mean that younger peo-
ple have more adaptive preferences or are more swayed by the informational effect of
prices.19
It is likely that only people who have actually visited a doctor would revise their
preferences since they would have had to experience co-paying for the doctor visit
(barring those few who were exempted). To this end, we excluded from the sample
those observations for which there were no visit to the doctor in the quarter prior to
the interview. Using the models with control variables, the estimated DID coefﬁcients
[s.e.’s] from the POL and OLS models are 0.128 [0.064] and 0.049 [0.027], respectively.
Finally, we note that the effect is driven by the males in the sample. The parameter
of interest turns insigniﬁcant if we restrict the sample to females. However, it does
carry the same sign and remains signiﬁcant when the sample is restricted to males.
Speciﬁcally, the estimated parameters [s.e.’s] in the models with a full set of control
variables are 0.119 [0.062] in the POL model and 0.040 [0.024] in the OLS model.
19We conﬁrm this by re-estimating the original model but limiting the observations only for those
people who are younger than 25. We obtain a positive and signiﬁcant estimate of the treatment effect in
thisregression. Additionally, weperformplaceboregressionssimilartotheonesdescribedinSection5.4
to support the assumption of parallel trends. The results conﬁrm that both the treatment and alternative
control groups followed the same trend before the intervention.
196 Conclusion
Economists now routinely use measures of subjective well-being in their research.
However, it is not clear at the outset that we can contribute much to a better under-
standing of these measures. As Hamermesh [2001] puts it, “[W]e have not done much
to justify our incursions.” Nevertheless, among the numerous subjective measures at
our disposal, SRHS is among the most prevalent as an object of analysis. Its advantage
is that it is highly correlated with objective measures of health. In the absence of the
latter, researchers resort to its subjective counterpart. It is therefore important to un-
derstand how this subjective measure behaves in response to stimulus changes in an
economic agent’s environment.
In 2004, Germany introduced a major reform in its health insurance system, which
effectively raised the price of health care services. Employing data from the SOEP
covering the periods 2000–2003 and 2005–2007, the natural experiment resulting from
this reform package is exploited to examine its impact on the SRHS of the statutorily
insured. The results of a DID estimation strategy indicate that the statutorily insured
rated themselves as healthier after the reform took effect. However, there is no evi-
dence to suggest that this improved self-perception of health is a result of an actual
improvement in the health status of the statutorily insured.
To explain this phenomenon, we appeal to the literature on cognitive dissonance
and the informational effect of prices. People seem to have a taste for consistency
and this may manifest itself when people change their actions in the present to make
their past choices conform to present circumstances. This involves a certain sense of
“self-deception” when people convince themselves that their optimal action ex ante
remains optimal ex post. Without such self-deception, people will have to live with the
psychological cost of a choice that turned out to be suboptimal ex post [Eyster 2002].
With respect to the informational effect of prices, there is some evidence that people
judge quality by price. A higher price can induce people to think that a good is better
20simply because of its higher price, i.e., people value goods not merely by its price but
foritspriceaswell[Scitovszky1944]. Unfortunately, wecannotidentifywhichofthese
two mechanisms actually was in play but sufﬁce it to say that the evidence indicates a
disjoint between subjective and objective measures of health.
These subjective measures are liable to what Hamermesh [2001] calls the “scaling
problem”. Essentially, subjective measures are the result of a conversion of an under-
lying continuous ordinal measure into a measure that has only a few categories. The
psychological process of this conversion from an unobservable continuous measure
into a self-reported polychotomous measure is something which we as economists
know very little about. Yet, national governments are keen to use these subjective
measures to complement traditional indicators of economic development. For exam-
ple, the government of France has sponsored and endorsed the report of the Com-
mission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, which
recommends, among others, using measures of subjective well-being. Therefore, it is
all the more important now to look at the reliability of these measures. At least in the
realm of health, we advocate the collection of more objective measures, particularly
biomarkers, since we feel that these measures are less subject to the vagaries of an
individual’s perception of oneself.
***
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